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Abstract
Regulators, policy makers, and consumers are inter-
ested in proactively identifying services with acceptable
or compliant data use policies, privacy policies, and
terms of service. Academic requirements engineering
researchers and legal scholars have developed quali-
tative, manual approaches to conducting requirements
analysis of policy documents to identify concerns and
compare services against preferences or standards. In
this research, we develop and present an approach to
conducting large-scale, qualitative, prospective analyses
of policy documents with respect to the wide-variety of
normative concerns found in policy documents. Our ap-
proach uses techniques from natural language processing,
including topic modeling and summarization. We eval-
uate our approach in an exploratory case study that at-
tempts to replicate a manual legal analysis of roughly 200
privacy policies from seven domains in a semi-automated
fashion at a larger scale. Our findings suggest that this
approach is promising for some concerns.
1. Introduction
Privacy policies support commerce by informing poten-
tial customers of business practices involving their data.
The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigates
incongruities between stated and actual business prac-
tices. Mishandling of privacy can be costly as two recent
cases highlight. In July 2019, Equifax agreed to pay at
least $650 million for a data breach that affected some
150 million people [1]. That month, Facebook was fined
$5 billion for violating customer privacy and was forced
to revamp its privacy protection practices [2].
These cases highlight the reactive nature of inves-
tigations, which typically begin only after a complaint
is received. There is a need for rapid analysis of many
privacy policy documents from websites across multiple
industries [3]. Unfortunately, proactively evaluating pri-
vacy practices is tedious and challenging. These analyses
often require significant manual effort. For example, in
2016, Marotta-Wurgler (Section 3) published a study of
261 privacy policies whose goal was to measure online
site compliance with self-regulatory guidelines [4]. A
team of nine investigators hand coded the presence of 49
recommended practices [4]. With over one billion web
servers [5], manual analyses cannot scale to the Web.
We propose a semi-automated method based on the
natural language processing of a large privacy policy
corpus that relies on a manual analysis of a smaller subset.
We wish to determine the extent that we can automate
large-scale analyses using a sentence similarity baseline
method. Using a corpus of two thousand documents,
we will focus on the notice-related concerns from the
Marotta-Wurgler study. Our research questions are:
RQ1: Which of the Marotta-Wurgler notice-related pri-
vacy concerns can be identified from our corpus
using a sentence similarity-based approach?
RQ2: How well does our similarity-based approach
identify privacy concerns in our policy corpus?
Our results indicate that semi-automated analysis can
indeed allow for future work to target much larger cor-
pora. We were able to identify relevant sentences con-
taining keywords for 9 of the 21 notice-related concerns
identified by Marotta-Wurgler with an average sensitiv-
ity and specificity of 93.8 % and 98.3 %, respectively.
When combined with other concerns whose sentences
were identified with higher average specificity (97.8 %.)
but lower average sensitivity (35.6 %), sentences from 17
of the 21 notice-related privacy concerns were identified.
This suggests that, while not all relevant sentences can
be found, most of those found will be.
Our work proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we sur-
vey concepts and techniques necessary for this work.
Section 3 describes two prior analyses of privacy policy
corpora. In Sections 4, and 5, respectively, we describe
our methodology and evaluation process, and present the
results of evaluating our method with a corpus of 2061
policies. We continue with a discussion our results and
the limitations of our approach in Sections 6 and 7, re-
spectively, and conclude with a summary of our findings
in Section 8.






In this section, we describe techniques and concepts that
are related to this study. We begin by discussing extrac-
tive text summarization, followed by vector space models.
We then discuss semantic similarities and conclude with
the total recall problem.
Extractive Text Summarization Our approach depends
on the identification of sentences similar to manually-
selected exemplar sentences relevant to a privacy concern.
We use extractive text summarization to find candidate
exemplar sentences likely to match the greatest number
of relevant sentences with the same keywords. A few of
the highest-ranking sentences can serve as a summary.
We chose LexRank, an extractive text summarization
algorithm that uses similarity graphs to connect sentences
whose cosine similarities exceed a threshold [6].
Vector Space Models In order to identify similar sen-
tences, we must first find a suitable computer representa-
tion to encode their features. Text inherently lends itself
to sparse representations requiring large amounts of com-
puter memory and computing time [7, 8]. For some of
our work, we addressed this via a dimensionality reduc-
tion technique, latent semantic indexing (LSI), which
uses a singular value decomposition to project the words
into a smaller concept space [9, 10, 11, 12]. As an added
benefit, Words that appear in similar contexts are pro-
jected into the same concepts so that documents can be
close to each other without sharing common words [11].
Newer techniques such as word2vec [13], GloVe [14],
Elmo [15], and BERT [16] use neural networks to achieve
dense representations. These techniques are more sensi-
tive to the surrounding word context and give additional
semantic information. We chose a preexisting BERT
embedding for a portion of this work and compared the
results obtained with those from using LSI.
Semantic Similarity Once we identified the exemplar
sentences and calculated the sentence features, we needed
a means to identify sentences that are similar to the exem-
plars. We used cosine similarity, which treats the word
features as vectors and uses the angle between two vec-
tors; the greater the angle, the less similar the words [17].
The Total Recall Problem The semi-automated analysis
of privacy policies shares aspects with the Total Recall
Problem (TPC), an information retrieval problem where
only a small fraction of a population is relevant and each
member of that population can be inspected [18, 19]. The
goal is to reduce the cost of high recall with a human
in the loop [18, 19]. The best strategy for language-
based TPC is to apply active learning with vector-based
features to a manually-labeled subset and then use the
trained system to prioritize the remaining items [19]. A
challenge is knowing when to stop the iterative process of
manually labeling positive examples and use the trained
model to predict the unlabeled ones [19].
Our baseline method is similar to the active learning
approach. For example, we use vector-based features
and identify positive examples (the exemplar sentences).
However, our method does not share the active learning’s
iterative nature. We evaluate the resulting similarity-
based classifiers on a subset of the data, but do not iter-
atively train them. The active learning approach to the
Total Recall Problem may serve as a useful strategy for
situations where we are unable to identify sentences with
high sensitivity using our method.
3. Related Work
In this section, we will survey four prior studies as well
a deep-learning based analysis framework.
RE 2013 Study and Corpus To allow us to generalize
our results, our exploration required a sufficiently large
and diverse corpus. We chose a corpus of 2061 privacy
policy and related documents drawn from prior privacy
document analysis work, the Google top 1000 websites,
and the 2012 Fortune 500 companies [3]. It was created
to determine if automated text mining can help require-
ments engineers determine whether a policy document
contains requirements expressed as either privacy protec-
tions or vulnerabilities. Massey et al. used topic modeling
to identify documents addressing concerns expressed via
goals-based requirements engineering and demonstrated
the ability to limit searches of the entire corpus to less
than 100 documents for certain goal keywords [3].
Marotta-Wurgler Study We benefited from the privacy
concerns identified in Marotta-Wurgler’s 2016 study [4]
of 261 privacy policies taken from seven online mar-
kets [4]. She found that the average policy only complies
with 39 % of the 2012 FTC guidelines [4]. The policies
were often silent in required or important areas. This
causes problems because there are often no default rules
to address these areas. Many companies collect informa-
tion and consumers have no way of knowing how much
is collected, how it is used, how long it is kept, or with
whom it is shared. The guidelines do not seem to be
driving policy development and the idea of companies
“competing on privacy” appears to be flawed [4].
Polisis The challenges of analyzing privacy policies at
scale led Harkous et al. to create Polisys, deep learning
based policy query answering framework that uses convo-
lutional neural networks classifiers, a privacy taxonomy,
and a custom language model created from 130,000 pri-
vacy policies for state-of-the-art results for structured
and free-form querying of privacy policies [20]. Polisys
relies on an embedded privacy taxonomy, which can limit
its use. Harkous et al. suggest that this can be mitigated
via additional training using another annotated data set.
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Figure 1: Data flow diagram of the semi-automated methodology for identifying sentences related to a privacy concern described in
Section 4. Portions of the diagram are labeled with the section or subsection which describes them.
We believe that the method described in Section 4 can be
used as part of a process to create such a data set.
GDPR Impact Studies Two recent studies attempted
to ascertain the impact of the European Union’s (EU)
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on privacy
policies. The first by Degeling et al., used a combi-
nation of automated and manual methods to routinely
inspect some 6,579 websites across the EU for evidence
of changes due to the enactment of the GDPR [21]. They
identified and downloaded some 112,041 privacy policies
into a database, extracted the individual sentences, identi-
fied changes with hash functions and analyzed sentences
for occurrences of GDPR-related phrases. They found
that most EU websites had made changes to address the
GDPR, though not all new requirements were being met.
Linden et al. also addressed the impact of the GDPR
on privacy policies. They collected 6,278 pairs of pre-
and post-GDPR versions of English-language privacy
policies and examined them for changes in five areas: vi-
sual presentation, syntactic text features, category-based
coverage, compliance to a small set of requirements, and
the specificity of certain privacy practices [22]. They
identified the English-language privacy policies using
a convolutional neural network and made use of Poli-
sis [20] to automatically label text segments. They con-
clude that the GDPR has driven many recent changes in
privacy policies, particularly in the EU [22].
4. Methodology
Our ultimate goal is to enable the future analysis of large
Web-based privacy policy corpora to determine the extent
to which specific privacy concerns are being addressed.
While previous studies have used manual methods on
smaller corpora, they will be intractable for our future
intended corpora. We plan to leverage a semi-automated
analysis of a small subset of a large corpus to perform an
automated analysis of the rest. Our approach requires di-
viding a large corpus into two portions: a smaller subset
of the privacy policies amenable to combined manual and
automated analyses and the much larger remainder which
can only be analyzed using automated methods. Our goal
for this work was to explore whether this approach is fea-
sible and to identify potential issues for future research.
The methodology described below was intended to repre-
sent a minimally viable technique and serves to establish
a baseline for more refined approaches. We used the
following criteria to answer our research questions:
RQ1 Measures: We determined which of the notice-
related privacy concerns could be identified using our
similarity-based approach while
(a) Excluding privacy concerns that address external
language or entities outside of a privacy policy.
(b) Excluding privacy concerns that have no identifi-
able keywords and require human interpretation to
determine whether they have been addressed.
(c) Excluding privacy concerns which do not have both
exemplar sentences containing relevant keywords
and higher sensitivity and specificity similarity-
based classification results with our test corpus.
RQ2 Measures: We determined how well our
similarity-based approach identified notice-related
concerns by clustering the classification results and
identifying the different cases as described in Section 4.6.
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Table 1: Notice-related concerns from Marotta-Wurgler’s study. Privacy concerns with a † are those for which we are able to identify
sentences using our method (Section 5).
Concern Description Concern Description
N1 Policy is accessible through direct link from the homepage N12 PII used internally for business purposes
N2 Users asked for consent when signing up via clickwrap N13 PII used for stated, context-specific purposes
N3 Layered or short notice is collected and stored N14 † Profile, picture, or other data may be used in ads
N4 Contact data is collected and stored N15 † Third party may place ads that track user behavior
N5 † Computer data is collected and stored N16 Recipients of shared or sold data are identified
N6 † Interactive data is collected and stored N17 Words such as “affiliates” are defined, if used
N7 † Financial information is collected and stored N18 † Company alerts user to material changes in policy
N8 Content is collected and stored N19 † User must explicitly assent to material changes
N9 † Sensitive information is collected and stored N20 † Material changes are retroactive
N10 Geolocation information is collected and stored N21 Describes data procedures if company is sold or closes
N11 Cookies used
We quantified the overall extent of these cases with the
fraction of the test corpus sentences containing relevant
keywords associated with the results for each case.
Our methodology, which is illustrated in Fig. 1 and
described below in Sections 4.1 through 4.6, began with
the selection of the small corpus and its division into
training and test sets (Section 4.1). We then chose the
privacy concerns to study (Section 4.2), identified their
exemplar sentences from the training set (Section 4.3),
created a vector space model from the training set sen-
tences (Section 4.4), and built similarity-based sentence
classifiers (Section 4.5). We ended with the evaluation of
the classifiers against the test set in Section 4.6.
4.1. Creation of Training and Test Sets
We began with a corpus consisting of several thousand
privacy policies, the RE 2013 corpus discussed in Sec-
tion 3. For the purposes of this work, this corpus will
serve in the place of a smaller subset of a much larger
corpus. It has been the subject of prior analyses and is
well understood. We randomly divided this corpus into
training and test sets using a 66/33 % split. We continued
by segmenting each document of the training and test
sets into individual sentences. We treated these sentences
as individual documents when we searched the corpus
for similar sentences to build our classifiers. These steps
are depicted in the lower left portion of Fig. 1.
4.2. Identification of Privacy Concerns
The upper left corner of Fig. 1 depicts privacy concern
identification. We focused on the set of 21 notice-related
concerns from Marotta-Wurgler [4] listed in Table 1. The
first three describe the online prominence of the policy
(N1, N2, and N3). Subsequent concerns focus on the user
data collected and stored (N4 through N10), the use of
cookies (N11), how personal and personally identifiable
information is used (N12 through N14), third parties
(N15 through N17), the handling of material changes
(N18 through N20), and data procedures if the site is sold
or ceases to exist (N21).
Notice is central to the “notice and choice” privacy
model espoused by the FTC which encourages the cre-
ation of privacy policies focusing on data collection [4].
These concerns also form the largest subset of the 49 in
Marotta-Wurgler’s study and we believed that their con-
crete nature would make them amenable to our approach.
4.3. Identification of Exemplar Sentences
In this and the following two subsections (Sections 4.4
and 4.5), we will use the privacy concern N19 (“User
must explicitly assent to material changes”) as the basis
of a running example to explain our methodology.
We began by identifying keywords for each privacy
concern (Fig. 1, upper right). For privacy concern N19,
we chose “you”, “opt-in”, and “change” as one set of pos-
sible keywords. These seemed reasonable based on the
results of text searches of the privacy corpus for “material
changes.”
We then filtered the training set using the stemmed
keywords. The N19 keywords and sentences in the train-
ing set were stemmed. For example, the sentence describ-
ing N19:
You will be given the choice at that time to “opt-
in” for any additional uses or disclosures of your
personally identifying information and/or health-
related personal information that you made avail-
able to us prior to the change in the Privacy Pol-
icy.
became
you will be given the choic at that time to opt
in for ani addit use or disclosur of your person
identifi inform and/or health relat person inform
that you made avail to us prior to the chang in
the privaci polici
Stemming simplifies text searches by normalizing words
so that their different forms are made identical.
Because many sentences matched the keywords, we
summarized the filtered sentences using LexRank (Sec-
tion 2) to identify a few of the most relevant ones. We
then selected those, which in our judgement are indicative
of the privacy concern to be our exemplar sentences and
excluded those that are not. For example, the previous
sentence was chosen as an exemplar. Despite containing
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Figure 2: The distribution of sensitivities and specificities for the classifiers trained and evaluated using the process described in
Sections 4.1 through 4.6. Undefined values are not shown. The solid lines denote 3-means cluster centroids and the dashed lines
represent the boundaries between the clusters.
the keywords, the following sentence is not concerned
with material changes and was not chosen:
You may change your interests at any time and
may opt-in or opt-out of any marketing / promo-
tional / newsletters mailings.
4.4. Creation of Vector Space Models
We evaluated two approaches for creating vector-space
models (VSM) of our privacy corpus. The first approach
used LSI and the second a pre-existing BERT embedding
(Fig 1, middle right).
For the LSI-based approach, we first created a tradi-
tional vector-space model (VSM) of the training set sen-
tences by stemming their words. Unlike typical practice,
we did not remove stop words because they help deter-
mine if a sentence should be selected. We then created
bag of words (BOW) for each sentence and applied a term
frequency-inverse document frequency (TFIDF) transfor-
mation followed by latent semantic indexing (LSI) using
400 dimensions, the value determined empirically by
Bradford as giving the best results for large corpora [23].
For the BERT-based approach, we used a preexisting
embedding which directly embeds each sentence into a
1024-dimension space [16]. Unlike LSI, we did not first
stem the words of the sentences when using this preex-
isting embedding as it was not created using stemmed
words.
4.5. Building Sentence Classifiers
Using the exemplar sentences and VSM from Sec-
tions 4.3 and 4.4, we created both LSI- and BERT-based
sentence classifiers for each concern (Fig 1, right).
These classifiers begin by first selecting sentences
from the test data that contain the predetermined key-
words associated with each privacy concern and then
selected those whose cosine similarity exceeds a selec-
tion threshold relative to at least one of their exemplar
sentences. We chose a threshold value of 0.5 based on
the intuition that for values above this threshold, the two
vectors representing the sentences are more generally
aligned with each other.
For example, consider a classifier that uses the exem-
plar sentence described in Section 4.3. It begins by using
the keywords associated with that exemplar sentence,
“you”, “opt-in”, “change” to filter test sentences. Let us
assume that the following sentence is to be classified:
You will be notified if any of the material changes
that affect the use of your personal information
and asked to opt-in to the new use of your per-
sonal information.
This sentence contains the keywords so the classifier
will then calculate its embedding. This value is compared
with that of the exemplar and the test sentence is rejected
as being below the selection threshold. It may yet be
classified as relevant if the classifier has another exemplar
for which the sentence exceeds the similarity threshold.
For the BERT-based version of this classifier, the
similarity between the exemplar exceeds the selection
threshold, and the sentence is classified as relevant. The
differences between the LSI- and BERT-based classifiers
are presented in Section 5 and discussed in Section 6.
We chose this classification scheme to address class
imbalances in the training set, to simplify classifier train-
ing, and to minimize the need for human-annotated data.
Most of the sentences are not relevant to a given privacy
concern and a random sample will not contain enough
positive examples to train a sensitive classifier. The com-
bination of keywords and exemplar sentences helped
improve the classification sensitivity to the small number
of relevant sentences. State-of-the-art methods, such as
those based on Deep Learning, offer high accuracy with
additional complexity and the need for large amounts of
annotated data. We instead decided to pursue a simple
approach that can still produce useful results.
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4.6. Evaluating the Sentence Classifiers
We decided to evaluate the performance of the classi-
fiers described in Sections 4.1 through 4.5 (Fig. 1, lower
right) in terms of sensitivity and specificity instead of
precision and recall as is typically done for information
retrieval. This is a consequence of us being more in-
terested in minimizing false negatives than minimizing
false positives. With privacy policies, the former repre-
sent obligations missed by the search which cannot easily
be found otherwise while the latter can be eliminated via
manual inspection. False negatives can represent legal
liabilities especially for a new product or service.
Sensitivity and recall are both synonyms for the true
positive rate which is the fraction of correctly classified
positive items [24, 25]. Specificity is defined as the true
negative rate (the fraction of correctly classified negative
items) [24, 25]. Classifier evaluation in terms of precision
is sensitive to class imbalances because changes in the
test data class distribution will change the classifier’s
apparent performance [24, 26]. By only considering a
single class of a binary classification, specificity and
sensitivity do not suffer from this “class skew” [24, 26].
This separate focus on the performance for each class also
allows for the consideration of “cost skew”, the different
cost associated with errors for each class [25].
As mentioned above, we are more concerned with
false negatives than false positives; for privacy policy
analysis, we believe that the cost associated with mis-
classifying sentences as not relevant is larger than that
of misclassifying them as relevant. Using sensitivity and
specificity will allow us to separate these two situations.
The similarity-based classifiers were evaluated using
sentences drawn from the test data. For each classifier,
sentences that contained the keywords were used to cre-
ate a test set. The sentences selected and rejected by each
classifier were manually examined to identify false posi-
tives and false negatives; we randomly sampled classifier
results when the output was too large for human analysis.
We calculated the sensitivity and specificity for each
classifier and used k-means clustering (k = 3) to par-
tition these values (sensitivity clusters: 0, 1, and 2 and
specificity clusters: 0, 1, and 2). We chose k = 3 to
roughly separate the sensitivity and specificity values
into three groups denoting “low,” “medium,” and “high”
to facilitate their analysis. Further investigation is needed
to determine whether this grouping of values is optimal
but we believe that it is a good starting point. These
clusters were then used to group the results and divide
them into five cases:
(i) Higher sensitivity and specificity (sensitivity
cluster 2 and specificity cluster 2).
(ii) Higher specificity (cluster 2 or “high”) with
lower sensitivity (cluster 0 “low” and cluster 1
or “medium”).
(iii) Higher sensitivity (cluster 2 or “high”) with
lower specificity (cluster 0 or “low” and cluster 1
or “medium”).
(iv) Mixed lower sensitivity and specificity values
(all clusters except sensitivity cluster 2 and speci-
ficity clusters 2)
(v) Undefined sensitivity or specificity
5. Evaluation Results
We will now present the results of evaluating the method
described Sections 4.1 through 4.5 using the process
described in Section 4.6 for the use case of searching
the RE 2013 privacy policy corpus for privacy concerns
N4 through N20 described in the Notice section of the
Marotta-Wurgler study. Concerns N1, N2, and N3 were
deemed as being addressed outside of the posted privacy
policies. Concerns N12 and N13 were combined because
they represented concerns that were too similar to be
resolved individually. Concern N21 was omitted because
initial searches of the corpus with command-line tools did
not find any candidate sentences for this privacy concern.
We began by dividing corpus into training and test
data using a 66 %/33 % split as described in Section 4.1.
This resulted in training data consisting of 1373 policy
documents and test data with 687 policy documents. We
then used spaCy to segment the 140 000 training sen-
tences and 68 400 test sentences.
Exemplar sentences were drawn from the training
data; we identified 56 sets of keywords and exemplar
sentences using the process described in Section 4.3. We
then used gensim to create a 400-concept VSM of the
training data sentences using LSI (Section 4.4).
For the BERT-based approach, we used the large
embedding provided by the Flair NLP framework [16,
27] which embeds text into a 1024-dimension space.
The keywords, exemplar sentences, and the vector
space models were then used to create 112 classifiers us-
ing the Python-based gensim package [28] as described
in Section 4.5, one for each combination of embedding
approach, set of keywords, and associated exemplar sen-
tences. An input sentence is selected if contains the
keywords and if its cosine similarity with an exemplar
sentence exceeds the preset selection threshold.
The classifiers were evaluated using the test data (Sec-
tion 4.6). Of the 68 400 sentences in the test data, 5695
matched the keywords used by our classifiers and were
used for evaluation. We calculated classifier sensitiv-
ity and specificity; their distributions are shown as his-
tograms in Fig. 2. We used k-means clustering to parti-
tion the sensitivities and specificities into three clusters:
“low,” “medium,” and “high”; their centroids and bound-
aries appear as vertical lines in Fig. 2. These clusters
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Figure 3: Results partitioned into tag clouds by their sensitivity and specificities. Each cell represents a separate tag cloud. The
upper right cell contains results with the highest sensitivities and specificities, whereas the lower left cell has undefined sensitivities
and specificities. Tag height is proportional to the number of associated classifiers. Tag position is not significant.
were used to group the results in Fig. 3 which were then
divided into the five cases described above in Section 4.6
and in the rows of Table 2.
Case 1: Combined Higher Specificity and Sensitivity
In addition to the results shown in Table 2, Table 3 gives
details for the Case 1 classifiers which belonged to both
sensitivity cluster 2 (“high sensitivity”) and specificity
cluster 2 (“high specificity”). This case contains 9 of
the 17 concerns for which we applied our method and
consisted of mostly relevant sentences with few missing.
Case 2: Higher Specificity with Lower Sensitivity
These results consisted of mostly relevant sentences but
the lower sensitivities meant some were missing. When
combined with Case 1 above, 97 % of the test sentences
were classified with high specificity; sentences identified
as relevant to a privacy concern were likely to be relevant.
These high specificity results corresponded to all of the
concerns (N4 through N20) we considered.
Case 3: Lower Specificity with Higher Sensitivity
Here, most of the relevant sentences were selected but
many non-relevant ones were included as well. When
combined with Case 1, 93 % of the test sentences contain
both cases’ keywords and be found with high sensitivity.
These high sensitivity classifications also corresponded
to all of the concerns (N4 through N20) we considered.
Cases 4 and 5 The last two rows of Table 2 show the
results for Case 4 (Lower Specificity and Lower Sensi-
tivity) and Case 5 (Undefined Sensitivity or Specificity).
The former were a mixture of relevant and non-relevant
sentences. The latter’s had undefined specificities or sen-
sitivities which occurred when the test set lacked either
positive or negative examples.
We can now address our research questions:
RQ1: Which of the Marotta-Wurgler notice-related pri-
vacy concerns can be identified using our simple sentence
similarity-based approach?
Answer: Based on the measures that we’ve chosen for
RQ1 in Section 4, we are able to identify sentences from
9 of the 20 one notice-related privacy concerns given in
the Marotta-Wurgler study. These privacy concerns are
marked with a dagger in Table 1.
RQ2: How well does our similarity-based approach to
identify privacy concerns in a privacy policy corpus?
Answer: The 9 notice-related concerns from Case 1
above (Section 5) were classified with an average sensitiv-
ity of 93.8 % and an average specificity of 98.3 %. When
combined with the results of Case 2 whose sentences
were identified with an average specificity of 97.8 % and
an average sensitivity of 35.6 %, then sentences from 17
of the 21 notice-related privacy concerns can be identified
with specificities of at least 81 %.
The implications of these results for large scale anal-
yses of privacy policies are discussed in Section 6.
6. Discussion
Our goal is a means to analyze large privacy policy cor-
pora with reduced manual effort by leveraging the semi-
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1 Higher Higher 777 13.6 188 209 83.3 / 98.3 / 100 81.3 / 93.8 / 100
2 Higher Lower 5458 95.8 1253 555 82.2 / 97.8 / 100 0.00 / 35.6 / 71.4
3 Lower Higher 5000 87.8 113 4379 0.00 / 41.6 / 80.0 87.3 / 92.6 / 100
4 Lower Lower 837 14.7 109 427 0.00 / 44.7 / 80.0 50.0 / 68.2 / 80.0
5 Undefined † 263 4.6 162 129 NA NA
† Contains results with either unspecified sensitivities or specificities.
automated analysis of a small random sample that to
develop classifiers that can be used to analyze the remain-
der. These classifiers are grounded in the corpus; we
don’t expect them to work with other corpora. Rather,
we see the overall methodology as being the key contri-
bution to the analysis large privacy policy corpora.
We used privacy concerns identified by Marotta-
Wurgler to explore if we can combine keyword searches
with manual selection of exemplar sentences to develop
classifiers that find test set sentences similar to the exem-
plar sentences from the training set. If successful, this
could allow for tagging of documents in a large corpus
with a manual effort similar to that needed for a sample.
Our classification results fell into the five cases given
in Section 5 that represent the different conditions under
which sentences for the privacy concerns are identified.
We will now discuss the results for these cases.
Case 1: Combined Higher Sensitivity and Specificity
Table 3 reveals that for some of the privacy concerns, the
use of keywords and exemplar sentences combined with
the similarity-based classifiers allowed for test set sen-
tence identification with few false negatives and false pos-
itives. This case represents an ideal situation that offers
automation with little manual effort to extend Marotta-
Wurgler style analyses to large privacy policy corpora.
Case 2: Higher Specificity with Lower Sensitivity
This case mostly contains LSI-based results (Fig. 2, mid-
dle of top row). Here we identified relevant sentences,
but not all of them. The average specificity of 97.8 % and
the large fraction of test sentences with keywords suggest
that the best improvements will come by increasing clas-
sifier sensitivity. This can come by increasing the default
number (20) of exemplars suggested by LexRank. For
example, there were 1348 test sentences for (N9) “col-
lect + personal + information”; more exemplar sentences
could have increased the matches and the sensitivity.
When combined with Case 1, 97 % of the Case 2 test
sentences contain both cases’ keywords and can be found
with high specificity; sentences identified as relevant are
likely to be relevant. These combined cases also contain
all the concerns (N4 through N20) that we considered.
A more sophisticated classifier could improve sen-
tence identification by training on a large manually cu-
rated data set. Alternatively, an active learning that prior-
itizes sentences for manual inspection, such as the one
described by Yu and Menzies may be useful [19].
Case 3: Lower Specificity with Higher Sensitivity
This case’s average sensitivity of 92.6 % suggests that
our approach may be useful for small numbers of sen-
tences amenable to manual removal of false positives,
especially for the higher specificity values (80 %).
A means of improving the specificity when there
are many sentences, is to train better classifiers using a
manually annotated data drawn from initial results. These
new classifiers, could then be used with the similarity-
based one to identify sentences with a higher specificity.
These results are dominated by the BERT-based clas-
sifiers implying that BERT-based features may be more
advantageous than LSI-based ones by more consistently
allowing for the use of secondary classifiers when the
initial classification produces higher sensitivity results.
Case 4: Lower Specificity and Lower Sensitivity
These results may be enough for the automated com-
parative analyses described above. For example, N6
(“pages + viewed”) with LSI classifiers, and N7 (“col-
lect+financial+information”) with BERT classifiers had
specificities of 77.9 % and 80.0 % and sensitivities of
79.8 % and 73.1 %, respectively. As in Case 2, better
classifiers and active learning may improve the results.
Case 5: Undefined Sensitivity or Specificity Unde-
fined sensitivities meant that there were no relevant test
data items. For example, though the N14 keywords (“use
+ photograph + advertising − agree”) matched three test
sentences, all were correctly identified as not relevant.
Undefined specificities meant that there were only rele-
vant test set items; all sentences matching the keywords
should be selected and our classifiers provided no benefit.
Application to Privacy Policy Analyses As discussed
above, we rely on relevant keywords for each privacy
concern; not all keywords lead to high sensitivity results.
If a concern is best captured by multiple sets of keywords,
each leading to classifications with differing sensitivities,
then we will likely miss relevant sentences. However, we
obtained high-specificities for the majority of the notice-
related privacy concerns. While we cannot guarantee
finding all relevant sentences, we can achieve situations
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LSI 16 65 90.4 100
N5 collect+operating
+system
BERT 16 65 86.8 83.3
N6 your+browsing
+history
BERT 20 9 87.5 100
N7 include+credit
+history
LSI 20 16 83.3 100
N9 collect+medical
+information
BERT 16 12 83.3 83.3
N9 collect+sensitive
+information
BERT 20 16 92.9 100
N14 use+information
+advertising
BERT 20 428 94.6 88.5
N15 advertisements
+third+usage
BERT 11 12 90.9 100
N15 advertisements+third
+visit+collect-agree
LSI 15 11 100 100
N15 advertisements+third
+visit+collect-agree
BERT 15 11 90.0 100
N18 material+change+prior LSI 20 22 89.5 100
N18 material+change+prior BERT 20 22 100 100
N18 notice+change+notify BERT 20 58 100 100
N18 notice+change+prior BERT 20 68 100 100
N18 policy+change+notify LSI 20 58 82.1 100
N18 policy+change+notify BERT 20 58 96.4 100
N18 policy+change+prior LSI 20 17 100 100
N19 material+change
+accept
LSI 8 3 100 100
N19 material+change
+accept
BERT 8 3 100 100
N19 notice+change
+accept
LSI 16 20 81.3 100
N19 notice+change
+accept
BERT 16 20 100 100
N19 policy+change
+accept
LSI 20 28 100 100
N19 you+opt-in+change BERT 1 2 100 100
N20 material+change
+previous
BERT 3 6 100 100
where most of those identified are and their relative fre-
quencies and distributions across a corpus can form the
basis of large-scale analyses that yield valuable insights,
such as differences across market segments, in a manner
similar to Marotta-Wurgler’s analysis.
We envisage iterative analyses, starting with keyword
selection using text searches to verify that they lead to
relevant sentences. Subsequent classification using ex-
emplar sentences may uncover anomalies such as the ab-
sence of a privacy concern in a segment of the remaining
corpus. Further investigation could lead to new keywords
and exemplar sentences. Because its substantial qualita-
tive nature, the concept of saturation should be used to
end the iterations; it is reasonable to stop when no new
information is found despite systematic attempts [29].
7. Limitations
The methodology we present is a starting point for further
investigation of large scale semi-automated policy analy-
ses. Despite our encouraging results, we have not solved
the problem of semi-automated privacy policy analysis.
Our use of keywords is intended to mitigate the class
imbalances that occur in a random samples of privacy
policy sentences. We do not offer guidance on keyword
selection or evaluation. We believe we have made rea-
sonable choices. Further research could better determine
their selection or eliminate them altogether.
We rely on similarity to exemplar sentences to re-
duce the need for human-annotated ground truth and to
keep our baseline method simple while producing useful
results. We have necessarily forsaken the performance
of state-of-the-art methods. Additional studies could
explore the tradeoffs of using more complex methods.
We assumed sentences are at the appropriate level of
granularity for privacy policy analyses. This may not
hold for all privacy concerns, but this was both conve-
nient for our analysis and worked reasonably well for
those described by Marotta-Wurgler’s study.
For simplicity, we used a threshold for the cosine sim-
ilarity of 0.5 with the intuition that above this value two
vectors are more mutually aligned than not. In practice,
classifier receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves
could be used to select the thresholds.
The clustering of sensitivities and specificities into
“low,” “medium,” and “high” (Fig. 3) and their grouping
into “lower” and “higher” (see Table 2 and Section 5)
result from our choice of clustering algorithm and our
need to partition our results for analysis and discussion.
This is a qualitative interpretation similar to inter-rater
comparisons [30]. Further work is necessary to determine
optimal result clustering and labels in practice.
8. Summary and Future Work
We presented a semi-automated methodology for extend-
ing Marotta-Wurgler style analyses to large privacy pol-
icy corpora and provided an initial feasibility evaluation
with an existing privacy policy corpus. Our methodol-
ogy begins with a keyword-based search followed by
extractive summarization to find the most representative
sentences in a policy corpus. They are then manually
inspected to find exemplars for similarity-based classi-
fiers that identify other relevant sentences. The classifiers
identified sentences addressing concerns with varying re-
sults. For those identifiable with higher sensitivity and
specificity, the manual effort of analyzing a small subset
of a large privacy policy corpus could lead to automated
analysis of the rest. This condition accounted for 9 of the
17 privacy concerns for which we used our methodology.
When sentences were identified with higher sensitiv-
ity but lower specificity, the results were dominated by
the BERT-based similarity classifiers. The possibility of
improving the specificity suggests an advantage of BERT
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over LSI. Here the non-relevant sentences could be re-
moved manually or by using another classifier trained on
a subset of the corpus. When combined with the higher
sensitivity and specificity results, we were able to iden-
tify sentences from all seventeen privacy concerns with
which we evaluated our methodology.
Our future efforts will focus on increasing the num-
ber of privacy concerns identified while maintaining the
aesthetic of simplicity and minimal training data require-
ments. We will investigate using our method to create
training sets for additional downstream classifiers as well
as active learning approaches. We will also evaluate its
use on a much larger privacy policy corpus.
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